

新潟県立大学 国際地域研究科  
入試サンプル問題（英語）

次の英語問題（1）または（2）から一問を選び、解答用紙に解答を記入しなさい。

(1) 次の英文を読んで、問いに答えなさい。

Taliaferro, W. Jeffrey. (2000-2001) "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited", *International Security* 25 (3): 128-161より抜粋（一部変更）

Does the international system provide incentives for expansion? If so, should the United States seek to guarantee its long-term security through a grand strategy of preponderance (or primacy) and pursue opportunities to weaken potential great power competitors, such as China? Alternatively does the international system provide more disincentives than incentives for aggression? If this is the case, should the United States seek to guarantee its long-term security through a grand strategy of selective engagement? Two strands of contemporary realism provide different answers to these questions.

Offensive realism holds that anarchy—the absence of a worldwide government or universal sovereign—provides strong incentives for expansion. All states strive to maximize their power relative to other states because only the most powerful states can guarantee their survival. They pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. States under anarchy face the ever-present threat that other states will use force to harm or conquer them. This compels states to improve their relative power positions through arms buildups, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile (or even autarkic) foreign economic policies, and opportunistic expansion.

Defensive realism holds that the international system provides incentives for expansion only under certain conditions. Under anarchy, many of the means a state uses to increase its security decrease the security of other states. This is a security dilemma causes states to worry about one another's future intentions and relative power. Pairs of states may pursue purely security-seeking strategies, but inadvertently generate spirals of mutual hostility or conflict. States often, although not always, pursue expansionist policies because their leaders mistakenly believe that aggression is the only way to make their states secure. Defensive realism predicts greater variation in internationally driven expansion and suggests that states ought to generally pursue moderate strategies as the best route to security. Under most circumstances, the stronger states in the international system should pursue military, diplomatic, and foreign economic policies that communicate restraint.

Defensive realism has recently come under attack from critics of realism and even from fellow realists. Critics of realism, such as Andrew Moravcsik and Jeffrey Legro, fault various defensive realist theories for positing a role for domestic politics, elite belief systems and misperceptions, and international institutions. By including such variables in their theories, the critics argue, defensive realists effectively repudiate the core assumptions of political realism. Offensive realists, such as Fareed Zakaria and Randall Schweller, charge that defensive realism cannot explain state expansion because it argues that there are *never* international incentives for such behavior.

I argue that the debate between defensive realism and offensive realism over the implications of anarchy and the need to clarify defensive realism's auxiliary assumptions deserve attention for three reasons. First, the outcome of this theoretical debate has broad policy

implications. Defensive realism suggests that under certain conditions, pairs of nondemocratic states can avoid war, states can engage in mutually beneficial cooperation without the assistance of international institutions, and norms proscribing the development and use of weapons of mass destruction are largely epiphenomenal. In addition, offensive realism and defensive realism generate radically different prescriptions for military doctrine, foreign economic policy, military intervention, and crisis management.

Second, debates within particular research traditions, not debates between them, are more likely to generate theoretical progress in the study of international politics. By developing and testing theories derived from the same core assumptions, researchers can more easily identify competing hypotheses, refine scope conditions for theories, and uncover new facts. Arguably, this is a more productive strategy for the accumulation of knowledge than the current tendency among some scholars to brand entire research programs as “degenerative.” As Robert Jervis observes: “Programs-and, even more, their first cousins, paradigms-are ( a ) difficult to confirm or disconfirm. Not only do they shape what counts as a fact at all, but also there are so many steps between assumptions and outlooks on the one hand and empirical findings on the other that neither in social nor in natural sciences can the evidence ever be unambiguous.”

Third, regardless of whether realism is the dominant theoretical approach in international relations, it remains the bete noire of every nonrealist approach. Proponents of neoliberal institutionalism, various cultural theories, democratic peace theories, and constructivism all begin with the supposition that realism is an extremely limited, if not completely bankrupt, body of theory. In the interest of scholarly dialogue, it is important to clarify the predictions of particular realist theories.

I argue that defensive realism proceeds from four auxiliary assumptions that specify how structural variables translate into international outcomes and states’ foreign policies. First, the security dilemma is an intractable feature of anarchy. Second, structural modifiers-such as the offense-defense balance, geographic proximity, and access to raw materials-influence the severity of the security dilemma between particular states. Third, material power drives states’ foreign policies through the medium of leaders’ calculations and perceptions. Finally, domestic politics can limit the efficiency of a state’s response to the external environment. (830ワード)

1. この英文を日本語300字以内で要約しなさい。
2. 下線部アのsecurity dilemmaの意味について、日本語30字以内で説明しなさい。
3. 空欄 ( a ) に入る英語一語として、最も適切なものを選び、番号で答えなさい。  
(1) notoriously      (2) sadly      (3) reluctantly      (4) strangely

(2) 次の英文を読んで、問いに答えなさい。

Litwak, S. Robert. and S. Neil MacFarlane. (1987) "Soviet Activism in the Third World", *Survival* 29 (1): 21-39より抜粋 (一部変更)

In the late 1970s, Soviet direct and indirect intervention across the geographical zone spanning southern Africa and South-east Asia (Zbigniew Brzezinski's 'arc of crisis') presented a pattern which greatly concerned Western policy-makers. Given the rise of radical leftist regimes (such as Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan) with close economic, diplomatic and military links to the USSR, many Western scholars perceived the USSR to be gaining momentum in the Third World. Not surprisingly, these developments featured prominently in the report presented by Brezhnev at the CPSU'S 26th Congress in February 1981. From the Soviet perspective, the balance sheet after thirty years of activism in the developing world is clearly positive. Yet the gains accrued by the USSR are not as unambiguous as Western observers declared them to be - or as Soviet policy-makers perhaps hoped. Moreover, Soviet gains have often proved transient and carried considerable politico-economic costs, thus raising the question of just how much success the USSR can actually afford.

In assessing the Soviet record in the Third World, one need recall the relative international position of the USSR when Nikita Khrushchev and his colleagues took power in 1953. Diplomatically, the Soviet Union had no substantial ties with South Asian and Middle Eastern states, and was completely shut out of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. In military terms, the USSR was a Eurasian land power lacking the conventional capabilities to provide it a truly global reach. These limitations prompted one observer to quip that the designation of the Soviet Union as a super-power in the early post-war period was more an 'ascriptive courtesy' than a reflection of reality.

The initial burst of Soviet political activity in the developing world came in 1955 with the conclusion of a secret arms-sale agreement with Egypt (using Czechoslovakia as a conduit for the transfer) and the highly publicized visit of Soviet party leader Khrushchev to India. Prior to 1955, the USSR's third-world policy reflected the rigidities of the Stalinist system. During the final years of Joseph Stalin's rule, the USSR's scope for diplomatic manoeuvre in the Third World was severely limited because of Moscow's castigation of such nationalist leaders as Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Indonesian President Ahmed Sukarno for their supposed collaboration with the Western colonial powers.

The death of Stalin in March 1953 paved the way for the dramatic shift in Soviet policy towards the Third World. This change in attitude was manifested in Khrushchev's enthusiastic response to the meeting of Asian and African leaders at the 1955 Bandung Conference. In contrast to Stalin's exclusive emphasis on local Communist parties, Khrushchev pursued a policy of courting national bourgeoisies as a means of weakening Western influence in these states. Increased Soviet political flexibility, as well as the dramatic development of its nuclear and conventional forces during the 1960s and 1970s, permitted the USSR to compete actively with the United States for influence in the Third World.

The emergence of the USSR as a global military power since the late 1960s has been accompanied by a broadened conception of Soviet interests and prerogatives. At the 24th CPSU Party Congress in April 1971, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, in a formulation that has been often reiterated, stated: 'There is not a single significant question which today can be decided without or in defiance of the Soviet Union. And if anybody were to try to show that one could manage without the Soviet Union in the resolution of these issues, people would consider him odd'. The USSR's claim to political co-equality with the United States has been expressed with particular

vehemence *vis-a-vis* the Middle East, where the Soviet leadership has steadfastly maintained that no settlement is possible without Soviet participation.

In specific arenas, the Soviet Union took advantage of the 1959 Cuban revolution to undermine the American monopoly of military power in the Western hemisphere. The USSR's 1955 breakthrough in relations with Egypt and its support of the 1958 Iraqi revolution allowed the Soviet Union to outflank and then effectively neutralize the Baghdad Pact/CENTO alliance system. Continued Soviet support of the Arab states in their conflict with Israel has prevented any subsequent construction of anti-Soviet alliances in the Middle East. Sustained military assistance to North Vietnam brought the collapse of SEATO and the replacement of American with Soviet military power in Indochina. The Soviet-backed victory of the MPLA (*Movimento Popular para a Libertagao de Angola*) in the 1975-76 Angolan Civil War considerably enhanced the USSR's capacity to destabilize southern Africa and take advantage of that process. The Soviet Union's intervention on behalf of Ethiopia in the 1977-79 Ogaden War with Somalia enabled the USSR to secure a position on both sides of the Straits of Bab-al-Mandeb and, hence, the capacity to interdict the shortest sea route from Europe to the Persian Gulf. Finally, the USSR's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan to prop up an ailing client regime marked the first direct involvement of Soviet military forces on a mass scale in a third-world conflict.

( a ) this successful record of Soviet activism, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a relatively rapid decline in the Western position in the Third World. Decolonization removed much of the Western military presence in Africa, the Middle East, and South-east Asia. New third-world governments - many of which strongly objected to purported exploitation at the hands of the 'metropolitan' countries and the United States - were committed to distancing themselves from the Western alliance system. As reflected in the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement, these former colonial states actively sought ties with the USSR to balance their unequal relationship with the West. (959ワード)

1. この英文を日本語300字以内で要約しなさい。
2. 筆者は、スターリン時代におけるソ連の第三世界外交をどのように考えているか、50字以内で答えなさい。
3. 空欄 ( a ) に入る英語として、最も適切なものを選び、番号で答えなさい。

(1) In contrast to      (2) In addition to      (3) Nevertheless      (4) Moreover